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Introduction:
In light of recent troubling trends towards anti-democratic politicians in government, a
study of public leadership seems timely.1 The United States’ current flirtation with demagoguery
on the right and populism on the left is a good place to start. The founders of the American
republic were thoroughly concerned with demagoguery. They believed that the greatest threat to
democracy in the fledgling nation would come from the people themselves. Demagogues achieve
power from the bottom up. They start by preying on divisions and resentment in the populace
and end by overturning important democratic norms and institutions designed to protect the
interests of the people. The public, unfortunately, has repeatedly proven itself susceptible to the
siren-song of demagoguery.
History provides endless examples of the public falling prey to malign leaders who use
their popularity with the masses to garner influence and power. In ancient Greece, a politician
named Cleon discovered he could direct his speech to the masses of spectators at the Athenian
assembly instead of to his fellow legislators. He fashioned himself as a friend of the common
people and an enemy of the Athenian aristocracy. Intellectuals and political elites hated Cleon
but they could not seem to topple him. Aristophanes, a successful playwright, excoriated and
mocked him in his plays to no avail. Pericles, a well-respected Athenian politician and general,
became his political adversary and was removed from office after Cleon accused him of
mishandling the state’s money. But Cleon proved to be a formidable politician. During the
Pelopponesian war, he convinced Athens to reject peace with Sparta and pursued an aggressive
strategy which resulted in a few military victories, an attempt to brutally execute the entire male
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population of the island of Mytilene and, eventually, his death at the hands of a peltast at the
Battle of Amphipolis. In the end, Athens lost the war to Sparta.
The principle of democratic republicanism is that by forcing leaders to be accountable to
the people through elections, their decisions will track the interests of the public rather than a
handful of oligarchs and aristocrats. The legendary journalist H.L. Mencken somewhat
facetiously summarized the danger of relying on public opinion, stating “Democracy is the
theory that the common people know what they want, and deserve to get it good and hard.” If the
people elect bad leaders or they are ignorant of their true interests, democratic decisions will be
unjust and prompt bad outcomes.
Unfortunately, publics are not good at knowing what is in their best interests.2 The task of
creating democratic government, then, is not just to make it responsive but to make it outperform
the people for which it works. Knowing that people would eventually elect bad leaders, the
American founders, for instance, designed a series of institutions to withstand rash public
sentiments, demagogues and misinformation. They designed those institutions to constrain
representatives’ ambitions and incentivize responsible leadership. But even perfect institutions
are not a failsafe barrier to demagoguery. Institutions must be backed by a public that is willing
to uphold the principles for which those institutions stand.
The necessity of strong public opinion was not lost on the American founders. James
Madison’s assertion in Federalist 48 that mere “parchment barriers'' would not be sturdy enough
to ensure that the separate powers of government would not encroach on one another and lead to
the domination of one branch over the others is proof that the founders were aware of their
reliance on the public even as they feared it would be insufficiently wise to effectively run the
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country.3 In Federalist 51, Madison wrote that “a dependence on the people is, no doubt, the
primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary
precautions.”4 The founders’ prized institutions needed strong foundations in the public even as
those institutions were meant to instill the proper democratic principles and values in the people.
Therein lies the problem. The public is susceptible to bad leadership and poor decision
making. People need strong institutions to help them preserve democratic government. And yet
the institutions designed to protect against these threats are dependent on public opinion in the
first place. Therefore, the public must, on some level, willingly allow itself to be controlled. In
order to solve this dilemma, the founders made American republicanism a two-way street. While
the people are the only sovereign power, the government’s authority comes from the Constitution
-- not whatever the public happens to want at the moment. Institutions are relied upon to refine
and instruct public opinion but the public must have a baseline respect for the importance of
upholding those institutions. This perpetual interplay between the people and the government
holds the government accountable to the people and the people accountable to the principles and
values of the republic.
Recently, though, our institutions have shown signs of decay. The 2020 elections saw
false allegations of fraud and an attempt to overturn legitimate results. Officials in President
Donald Trump’s administration committed serious violations which blurred the lines between
government and politics.5 On January 6, 2021, rioters, urged on by President Trump and some of
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his allies, broke into the Capitol Building and attempted to stage a coup.6 Well over a quarter of
the public, meanwhile, believe the 2020 election was stolen.7
This thesis diagnoses why so many of the institutions the American founders relied on to
educate the public and protect against bad leadership are starting to falter and how we can fix
them. More broadly, it explores how we can get the public to elect good leaders. In order to
figure out solutions to these issues, I return to the first principles of American government to
decipher how it has shifted away from the founders' visions, often not in the right direction.
In chapter 1, I establish criteria for good political leadership. The criteria I construct will
determine what the public should look for in a representative and how a representative should
conduct herself. I also explore why representatives in the American republic should adhere to the
public’s perception of its own interest by acting as a delegate rather than judging what the
public’s objective interest might be as its trustee.
In the first part of chapter 2, I lay out the institutions and norms the founders established
to protect against demagogues and irresponsible leadership and how these institutions and norms
relied on a civically educated and democratically engaged public to function. In the second part
of chapter 2, I explore how and why these institutions and norms have changed and how those
changes have created vulnerabilities in government for demagogues to take advantage of. I also
explore the role of mass communication technology in dismantling some of the natural barriers
to demagoguery that founders relied on when they designed American institutions.
In chapter 3, I provide an overview of several different solutions to address changes and
decay in our institutions. These solutions will target three areas that must be reformed to better
6
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resist demagoguery: first, I address how we can elevate public opinion to make the public more
resistant to demagogic appeals and teach it to look for leaders with the qualities I establish in
chapter 1. Second, I address the unruly state of our election systems and campaign regulations
which have incentivized candidates to act irresponsibly. Finally, I provide institutional solutions
to address how new communication technologies have incentivized representatives and political
leaders not to do their jobs.

8

Chapter 1: What is a good political representative?
The success of representative democracy can be judged on two counts: responsiveness
and good governance.8 Responsiveness and good governance are pursued in the interest of
producing good outcomes. To avoid a political debate over the nature of what a good outcome is,
let us say that it is the effect of a policy that promotes, as James Madison put it, “the happiness of
the people” in a just way.9 An example of a good outcome could be a social program that helps
people out of poverty or a law that protects private property as long as both of those things
produce the most good possible in a way that promotes the continuity of democratic government.
In short, good outcomes should promote common prosperity without sacrificing the integrity of
democracy.
A government may produce good outcomes because it is responsive. An intimate
connection with the people causes democratic government to address the issues that affect the
greatest number of citizens as opposed to interests with the most resources. Responsive
government, however, does not always track what is in the best interest of the people.
Sometimes, it is at odds with good outcomes. The people may not recognize their own interests.
Voters can be duped by sophists and demagogues. Citizens may be blinded by too narrow a
conception of what is in their interest and ignore the interests’ of others to their own detriment.
In these cases, governments must still be responsive even at the expense of good outcomes to
ensure that citizens continue to trust in democratic institutions. After all, without the consent of
the people, democratic government loses its legitimacy and, consequently, its authority. And
while there is undoubtedly debate over the merits of democracy as opposed to other forms of

8

Guerrero, Alexander A. 2014. “Against Elections: The Lottocratic Alternative.” Philosophy & Public
Affairs 42 (2): 135–78.
9
Hamilton, Alexander, James Madison, and John Jay. 2009. “Federalist No. 62.” The Federalist Papers.

9

government, I will make the relatively safe assumption in this essay that democracy promotes the
best outcomes and no act of the government should come at the expense of its continuity.
In order to maintain their legitimacy while protecting against the public’s propensity for
poor decision-making, democracies rely on representatives who are both responsive and who
educate public opinion.10 Unfortunately, we cannot always rely on representatives to perform the
latter part of their duty. History is rife with examples of demagogues rising to power over a swell
of well-intentioned citizens desperate for a change. These demagogues may play the role of
representative but they do only part of the job. And if they claim to serve the common people,
they do not serve them in a way that promotes good outcomes. What, then, beyond
responsiveness should people look for in a political representative?
In this chapter, I will determine what qualities a good representative should have. In the
first part, I will argue that the primary role of the representative is to legislate while emphasizing
the importance of a representative’s rhetoric as tools for refining public opinion. Then, I will
establish the norms and criteria that representatives should embody to promote productive
deliberation. Finally, I will argue that American institutions demand that representatives act more
as delegates rather than trustees of their constituents while also asking them to refine how the
public perceives its interests.
A good representative is, first and foremost, a legislator. Therefore, her qualifications are
those that allow her to legislate well. Since, in a Madisonian legislature, good legislation requires
the ability to engage in deliberation, a good representative should be able to deliberate
productively. Deliberation requires privacy and respect for the proper norms. Privacy and a
healthy separation from the public allow representatives to advocate what they see as the public’s
true interests instead of what the public judges to be its interests. While privacy opens up corrupt
10
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legislatures to capture by special interests, done well, it gives representatives the freedom to
temper bad ideas and deliberate without worrying about public stances. It also cuts down on
grandstanding and favors the norms of productive debate.
Since norms favor productive deliberation, good representatives should also display
respect for the norms of debate. Some of these norms are fairly obvious. A good political
deliberator must be reasonable. She must be willing to engage in deliberation in good-faith and
to change her mind in light of new information. She must also deliberate with the goal of
achieving consensus. While critics say consensus may cause legislators to exclude certain views
from being introduced or taken seriously because they are too extreme and cannot find common
ground with other views, the preference for consensus is not a problem for two reasons.
First, the goal of deliberation must always be legislation. Since, in Congress, legislation
must be agreed upon by at least a majority of law-makers in both houses -- and often by a
two-thirds majority in the Senate -- the goal of deliberation should be consensus not just
discussion. Second, the ability to outvote factional interests is a key function of the legislature.
Extreme views will always make their ways into government. In Federalist 10, James Madison
argued the legislature’s finest feature is its ability to “break and control the violence of faction”
without completely suppressing its free expression.11 Madisonian institutions like Congress are
designed to handle a diversity of viewpoints and ideas. Only ideas that achieve consensus,
though, successfully work their way through the institution. A demagogic member in Congress,
for example, does not constitute a threat to democracy as long as her ideas are not shared by her
colleagues. Consensus, therefore, is a sieve through which ideas must pass in order to become
law. As long as representatives act responsibly, it catches the bad ones and lets the good ones
through.
11
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Because representatives must work with political institutions, a good representative
should be familiar with, as Madison put it, “the means by which that object [of government] can
best be attained.”12 The ability to navigate complex institutional systems is a crucial skill to
deliver legislation. More importantly, political representatives must work within the confines of
the institutional powers prescribed to them by the Constitution. Good outcomes cannot come at
the cost of violating the rules and norms of institutions that ensure the continuity and stability of
government. Therefore, good representatives must have appropriate self-restraint in pursuing
legislation and issuing rhetoric. Knowing what kinds of behavior damage institutions and why
institutional maintenance is important are crucial qualities for a political representative to have.
Recent political trends in the United States have shown a rise in the public’s appetite for
anti-system politicians without experience in government.13 These anti-politician politicians wear
their inexperience like a badge of authenticity. They often claim not to have been corrupted by
the toxicity of politics and use their outsider status to distinguish themselves from a political
establishment they accuse of conspiring against the public.14 In the United States, the share of
candidates with no prior elected experience winning elections in both the Democratic and
Republican party has risen sharply since 2008.15 The appeal of these candidates is partly seen as
a response to disillusionment with the government institutions, namely Congress. Even in a
well-functioning democracy there is bound to be dissatisfaction with the legislative process.
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Congress -- especially the Senate -- was designed to be measured and slow in contrast to the
energy and unilateral efficiency of the executive branch. The founders deliberately built
inefficiencies into the legislative process. In Federalist 62, for example, Madison explains that
forcing bills to pass both the House and the Senate is “an additional impediment [...] against
improper acts of legislation” given that bills must be agreed on by the people, represented by the
House, and the States, represented by the Senate.
These inefficiencies can understandably be a source of discontent. People feel that
representatives are not acting in their interests or that they have been corrupted. Additionally,
complicated institutional structures, esoteric language and the difficulty of knowing one’s own
interests can cause citizens to distrust institutions and the people who run them. The
anti-politician candidate can take advantage of these sources of distrust by standing in contrast to
them. These candidates may use simple moral arguments that are easy to grasp, fiery rhetoric
punching up on elites who run complex institutions that do not ever seem to deliver on what they
promise and provide quick-fix solutions to big problems. While those things may sound good to
voters, they are rarely conducive to good legislating and deliberation at least partially because
good legislation requires respecting the deliberative norms of the institutions those candidates
choose to disparage. Experience in government and an understanding of how legislative
institutions function are important qualifications for a representative.
I will note here that a commitment to legislating is not a given. Some representatives
may feel that the rhetoric they push is more important than the legislative work they actually get
done. Rep. Madison Cawthorn -- elected to Congress in 2020 -- famously built his congressional
staff around communications instead of legislative staffers. While there is undoubtedly value in
the rhetorical firepower a representative can bring to an issue, rhetoric is not the essential
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function of a representative. A representative must legislate. Her qualities should be measured
with an eye towards this function.
That said, the importance of political rhetoric has played an increasingly important role in
governance since Teddy Roosevelt’s presidency in the early 20th century.16 It can be a means of
educating and leading the public as well as pandering to it. The character of a representative’s
rhetoric, therefore, is dependent on the character of the representative. There is some debate as to
how rhetoric can be used to shape and educate public opinion. Roosevelt, for one, used oratory to
push his legislative agenda by using the weight of his popularity to put political pressure on
Congress. For example, when he ascended to the office of President, one of Roosevelt’s priorities
was to break up railroad conglomerates that he determined were monopolistic and immoral.
Congress, however, did not share his zeal for railroad reform. Met with a resistance in
government, Roosevelt went directly to the people. He spoke in simple, democratic terms in
order to make his message clear. The people, in turn, pressured their representatives. Though
Roosevelt’s legacy as successful regulator of monopolies is disputed, eventually, he signed into
law the Elkins Act and the Hepburn Act which expanded the regulatory power of the government
and helped his administration successfully sue to break up the railroad conglomerates. Aside
from its success, the power and form of Roosevelt’s rhetoric is significant. He lowered his
speech to the level of common folk without pandering or rabble rousing, effectively leveraging
the political power of the presidency without teetering over the edge of demagoguery to get his
way.
Abraham Lincoln had a different but equally significant approach. Lincoln used oratory
to educate the public on the values and ideals of his vision for the republic. Instead of lowering
himself to the level of the public, however, his rhetoric was lofty and sought to lift the public to
16
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higher values. At times, he even spoke publicly about uncomfortable truths. In his second
inaugural address, for instance, he suggested that the violence of the Civil War was “the woe due
to those by whom the offense [of slavery] came.” Despite a taste for religious and moral
arguments, Lincoln’s rhetoric was far from demagogic. Instead, it appealed to the better nature of
public sentiments and occasionally even involved legal argument. His first inaugural, for
example, claimed that secession was unconstitutional because the Union was underwritten by the
fundamental law that government is perpetual. It does not provide the means for its own
termination. Both Roosevelt and Lincoln’s oratory sought to educate the public in different ways
rather than play to tensions in the populace to generate political influence.
The medium of a leader’s rhetoric also plays a role in its ability to educate and uplift
public opinion. Written rhetoric, as opposed to oratory, is less conducive to demagoguery. In the
early stages of the American republic, the founders instituted norms discouraging presidents
from engaging directly with the people about policy. They worried that presidents might sway
public opinion, appeal to the masses and tip the executive branch into despotism. They
considered the written word more suited to the office. Written rhetoric, they thought, favored
reason rather than passion because it required the reader to sit and reflect on the rhetoric instead
of being moved to action hastily by a persuasive speaker.
Rhetorical norms have changed as the presidency has become a more publicly oriented
office expected to wield political clout in the interest of a partisan legislative agenda.17
Technological advancements aiding the spread of information have increasingly incentivized
politicians and representatives to use oratorical rhetoric to build followings. The result has been
an increasing number of representatives speaking primarily to the people instead of to their
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colleagues in government.18 This public-facing rhetoric forces representatives to be too
responsive to their constituents. Instead of deliberating the merits of policy with other
lawmakers, politicians have increasingly turned to the media to apply public pressure on their
colleagues to pass legislation. Those public facing arguments are often pandering rather than
educational and they undermine the proper functioning of legislatures by forestalling debate and
incentivizing political theater rather than deliberation in committee and on the floor.
We have seen that good political representatives must educate the public while also
remaining responsive to it. But how should a representative strike this balance? Should a
representative act as trustee or a delegate?19 When a representative becomes too responsive to the
public, she risks pandering, demagoguery and failing to act in the public’s interest if the public
fails to accurately judge its true interest for itself. A representative who falls too far in the other
direction loses the faith of her constituency and, by extension, her authority. A good
representative must fall somewhere in the middle. But where exactly should “somewhere” be?
Should it lean towards responsiveness or edification?
The American founders were more split. Madison’s vision for the House in The
Federalist was for representatives to be much more closely tied to public opinion. In Federalist
52, he addresses the frequency of elections in the House, explaining that it “should have an
immediate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with, the people.”20 While representatives
would be allowed some distance from public opinion to make decisions that the public had
neither the time nor the expertise to make, frequent elections would hold them accountable to
even the relatively short-lived sentiments of the public. Still, Madison realized that the public
18
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would occasionally be mistaken. His vision for the Senate entailed a broader representative
claim. Senators would be older, more distinguished and would only be beholden to elections
every six years. In Federalist 62, he explains that these criteria are justified by the expansive
“nature of the Senatorial trust” which requires “ a greater extent of information and stability of
character.”21 People might take a while to figure out the right answers to their problems.
Senators, therefore, would have more space to judge the public’s best interest for themselves.
Still, Madison hoped that virtuous representatives would help the public recognize its
own best interests and the best solutions to its problems. Those representatives would refine
public opinion so that it did not undermine government itself. The hope that representatives
would refine public opinion is indicative of the founders’ fears that the threat of totalitarianism
was more likely to come from below than above. In Federalist 1, Alexander Hamilton famously
wrote,
History will teach us that the former has been found a much more certain road to the
introduction of despotism than the latter, and that of those men who have overturned the
liberties of republics, the greatest number have begun their career by paying an
obsequious court to the people; commencing demagogues, and ending tyrants.22
If existential threats to government are more likely to come from candidates who claim to speak
for the people then it seems prudent to allow representatives more distance from public opinion.
But allowing greater distance from the people supposes that representatives are virtuous
enough to uphold institutional barriers without being beholden to public opinion. Madison was
optimistic that a large republic would naturally produce good leaders but he was not naive. He
knew that people would elect demagogues eventually. So, to protect against ill-informed public
21
22
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opinion and politicians using populism to their advantage, the founders formed two houses in the
legislature. The House would be more democratic with a larger body and members representing
smaller constituencies. Two year terms would make it more sensitive to the people and political
trends. The Senate’s cooler, more deliberative disposition would then counterbalance the House.
The bicameral legislature as a whole, meanwhile, would pit the ambitions of representatives
vying for the interests of their constituencies against one another and force cooperation between
the two houses.
Still, the founders understood that none of these institutional checks would be sufficient
without public support. In any democratic system, the public must both consent to be ruled
through elections and inculcate its values in the legislative process.23 In order to accomplish
these two things, the public votes. It tries to elect good representatives with the proper
democratic values and an interest in governing well. While it might have been tempting to lay
responsibility for the republic in the hands of an elite few, Madison realized that “enlightened
statesmen will not always be at the helm.”24 He knew that virtuous representatives would not
always instruct the public as ambition tempted them into pandering leadership. Even religion, he
argued, could not be counted on to protect against bad leadership because history had proved it to
be often used to justify malicious intent.
The republic, therefore, had to be able to weather the consequences of both ill-informed
public opinion and malicious leadership. It could not place the responsibility for upholding the
institutions firmly on either the side of the people or their representatives. Despite fears that
public opinion would, left unchecked, descend into chaos and faction, Madison also had faith
that the legislature could handle an array of ideas by weeding out factions and promoting
23
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interests shared by a majority of the members. Maybe it is precisely because he was so wary of
the people’s ability to consistently elect good leaders that he was unwilling to allow
representatives to judge interest as an objective value. If people always elected good
representatives then there would be little risk of a demagogue usurping power and subverting
democracy in his favor. We could have faith in representatives’ expertise and interest in
governing in pursuit of the true interests of their constituencies. But bad leaders do rise to power.
The American Congress, therefore, was built to deal with biased interests that might or might not
represent the true interests of a constituency.
In his book The Constitution of Knowledge, Jonathan Rauch explains the Madisonian
process of finding truth through the competition of ideas. Rauch argues that Madison’s
experience as a politician taught him “about the way that political forces act and interact over
time; and when he foresaw them acting dangerously, he thought about using them to counteract
each other.”25 Perhaps it was this experience that led Madison to construct institutions that
provided for human fallibility. While a single representative was unlikely to come up with a right
answer on his own, a body of representatives might.
Because determining the objective interests of his constituency was no more likely to be
right than the constituents themselves, the job of the representative was not to judge what the
interest of his constituency is for himself but to take into account what his constituency saw as its
interest. Then, by bringing all of these subjective interests together, representatives could
negotiate and compromise until they reached common ground. It is only by taking into account
all possible interests that accurate knowledge can be uncovered and good legislation achieved.
Interests and ideas that are repeatedly deemed too fringe are thrown out. Others that are

25

Rauch, Jonathan. 2021. The Constitution of Knowledge: A Defense of Truth. Chapter 4. Brookings
Institution Press.

19

consistently shared throughout the legislature make the cut and are addressed by legislation, thus
tracking justice and taming extremist ideas.
This process of elimination is not necessarily quick or satisfying. Madison did not
envision that the people would accurately identify its own interests the first time. It is only
through the repetition of the process that, eventually, good outcomes are achieved over time.
Additionally, Madison saw the process of epistemic competition in determining objective interest
as a healthy political exercise. Competing interests in the legislature would be forced to form
political fronts and alliances. Ideally, these fronts would shift regularly thereby staving off
polarization and gridlock.
But it was not just that a marketplace of ideas and a subjective view of interest in the
legislature would create good outcomes. While the founders hoped that representatives in
Congress would help refine public opinion, they knew that wouldn’t always be the case. Even
political representatives ought to have virtue and a desire to serve others, the founders saw
human nature as fundamentally selfish. They designed the government so that the ambitions of
the people leading it would counteract and hold each other in check. Madison famously wrote,
“Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with
the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices
should be necessary to control the abuses of government.”26 Relying on representatives to act
altruistically out of a sense of virtue was simply not realistic.
Elections, of course, would incentivize representatives to act according to the interests
their constituents perceived as their own, regardless of whether their perceived interests were
actually their objective interests. But, assuming representatives would even have the expertise to
distinguish their constituencies’ true interests from perceived interests, it would take real
26
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political courage to stand up to voters and tell them they are mistaken about what their interests
are and to act against their wishes. Consequently, representatives are not incentivized to act in
the interest of the common good. The common good can only be achieved through the functions
of Congress. The founders realized that representatives could not be relied on to act in the
interest of anyone other than themselves and their constituencies. The common good had to be
aggregated through the Madisonian process of collecting every perceived interest in the country,
representing them in the legislature and, ultimately, finding common ground between them.
What we are left with is a model for a representative that hopes for the best and plans for
the worst. The founders devised a system that would work best when representatives edified the
public as well as representing them. But they knew representatives would sometimes be too
fallible, ambitious and selfish to instruct the public reliably. Therefore, they did not ask for
representatives to try to judge what the true interests of the country were but rather to advocate
the subjective interests of the people who elected them. The founders’ Congress was designed to
deal with representatives acting more as delegates than trustees. But the founders also hoped that
virtuous representatives would help inform the public’s values and principles through their
rhetoric if not always through their votes. As political scientist Eric Schickler put it in describing
the work of David Mayhew, “ambitious individual actors are both responsive to constituent
preferences and are active molders of those preferences through their activities in the public
sphere.”27
The virtue of a good representative lies in her ability to educate the public’s perception of
its own interests. The more virtuous representatives elected, the better public opinion would
become and the more deliberative the legislature, thus creating better policy outcomes. The trick,
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then, is to get people to elect the right representatives -- or at least not to elect the bad ones.
Madison thought that institutions would form good representatives and the founder believed
there were natural barriers that would keep bad leaders from becoming too powerful. In the next
chapter, we will explore how American institutions were created to help form good leaders, what
the natural barriers to bad leaders are and how these things have changed over time.
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Chapter 2: How did the founders design American institutions to produce good leaders?
How have those systems changed?
It is not enough that we simply educate people about qualifications for good leadership
and hope that they vote those qualities in mind. Elections do not primarily turn on the ideal
qualities of leadership that I established in chapter 1. Rather, their outcomes are more often the
result of political trends which shift regularly and often quite quickly. Virtues of deliberation,
high-minded rhetoric and steadiness are not always attractive electoral qualities even if they
make for good political leadership. In short, the attributes that get people elected are not
necessarily the same ones that make them good representatives. Molding representatives to be
better than they are naturally, therefore, is a crucial role of the institutional structure of
representative democracy.
In this chapter, I explain how the founders of the American republic designed institutions
to shape political leadership with a reliance on a public of sufficient size and diversity of
interests. I then analyze how intercourse between the public and political leaders is necessary to
produce both good leadership and useful public opinion. Finally, I examine how many of the
founders’ institutional designs and the natural barriers to demagoguery that they relied on have
decayed and changed.
We saw in chapter one that the public is susceptible to dangerous sentiments and styles of
leadership. Resentment, polarization and demagoguery have plagued democracy since its
conception. In anticipation of these natural democratic pitfalls, governments devise ways to
incentivize good leadership in their elected officials and good political decisions by their publics.

23

To a certain extent, good leadership will always depend on the virtue of the leader at hand. No
institutional barrier or norm will ever transform a leader who does not respect democratic values
into one who does. Leaders' actions are, however, subject to the confines of the institutions in
which they work. Therefore, well constructed institutions can incentivize responsible leadership
and soften the impact of bad leadership.
The founders were acutely aware of the necessity for American institutions to mold the
leaders running them. In Federalist 57, Madison outlined how the legislature would help create
good leadership and good governance. First, by limiting the term of appointment for
representatives, the Constitution ensured members would be accountable to the people through
regular elections. This form of popular accountability would function, not only retrospectively -with citizens re-electing their representatives according to their satisfaction with their
performance -- but also proactively by forcing a representative’s largest source of influence to be
the people she represents. While a representative might be able to obtain power in the legislature
by institutional means, the easiest way for a representative to garner influence is through the
public. A representative’s ambition, therefore, would incentivize him to lead in a way favorable
to his constituents.
To observe the distinction between popular power and institutional power, we need look
no further than the recent prevalence of newly elected House members who have built their
campaigns on national cultural issues rather than local interests. The institutional power of new
House members is relatively little. Committee and party leadership is assigned largely on the
basis of seniority and experience. These new representatives, however, have leveraged their
national celebrity and large social media followings to increase their influence over more senior
members in their own parties. The emergence of Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and The Squad
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on the left and of firebrand religious Conservatives Marjorie Taylor Greene and Lauren Broebert
on the right exemplify how even freshman members of the House with a minimum of
institutional power can increase their influence through popular support in the public.28 While
there are serious dangers that I will address in the second part of this chapter that the founders
did not foresee with this particular form of popular leadership, the Madisonian Congress relied
on the incentive of public popularity to keep representatives in line with public opinion.
Ultimately, Madison argued, the human desire to be well-liked and honored would cause
representatives to have “a temporary affection at least to their constituents.”29 And while the
incentive of institutional influence of chairmanships and leadership positions within Congress is
important to understanding the behavior of representatives, the force of public power is stronger.
In his seminal work, Congress: The Electoral Connection, David Mayhew argues that
interpreting the behavior of members of Congress “hinge[s] on the assumption that United States
congressmen are interested in getting reelected”.30
Madison also foresaw other natural institutional incentives to good governance in the
legislature. The cleverness of Madisonian institutions is not in the force they exert to quiet
human nature but rather in their keen understanding of human ambition. In Federalist 57,
Madison explains that even representatives’ selfishness can be harnessed for good.
His pride and vanity attach him to a form of government which favors his pretensions and
gives him a share in its honors and distinctions. Whatever hopes or projects might be
entertained by a few aspiring characters, it must generally happen that a great proportion
of the men deriving their advancement from their influence with the people, would have
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more to hope from a preservation of the favor, than from innovations in the government
subversive of the authority of the people.31
Because the success of government would reflect directly on representatives, their professional
aspirations would be connected to their ability to deliver good outcomes for the people. Another
natural incentive for representatives to deliver that Madison foresaw was in their personal stake
in the laws they passed. Because representatives themselves, their families and their friends
would be forced to live under the laws they themselves created, and public accountability would
keep them exempting themselves from laws, representatives would have an innate motivation to
care for the collective interests of their own communities.32
Institutional architecture, however, was only part of Madison’s equation for protecting
and promoting democratic governance. He also saw natural features of the country’s structure
that he believed would help curb demagoguery and factional divisions. In Federalist 10, Madison
argued that, for a number of reasons, the sheer size of the United States would make it difficult
for factional interests and demagogic leaders to influence the government at a national level.
First, Madison thought the larger the population of a polity the larger the pool of talent. With
more candidates to pick from, better leaders would be found naturally in the populace. While the
populace might not always choose the best candidate, on average, it would have better candidates
to choose from in the first place.33
Additionally, a larger country meant a greater diversity of interests. While more interests
would inevitably entail faction and, consequently, poor leadership, Madison believed Congress
could quiet the voices of the demagogues that made their ways into its ranks. In its infancy,
geographic differences across the United States and the importance of differing land resources on
31
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the separate economies of North, South and West created different needs in different parts of the
country. For example, while hard, unfertile earth in the North created an economy largely based
on trade and subsistence farming, the South’s more fertile fields led to an agricultural economy.34
The disagreement over slavery, among other polarizing issues, was derived in part from these
differing economic interests.35 And while disagreements between different parts of the country
over issues like slavery would eventually sow the seeds for racial resentment and demagogy in
local regions, they also ensured that these sentiments would not be well received outside of the
regions where they originated. Though slavery itself split the country and proved too contentious
for the legislature alone to handle, factional appeals to overt racism after the Civil War were not
enough to achieve national power.36
For example, a century after the Civil War, demagogic politicians like George Wallace in
Alabama used race and segregation to stir up crowds of people and win elections.37 Wallace,
however, never became president despite running four times. The issues that carried him to four
terms as governor of Alabama were not nationally appealing enough to carry him to national
office.38 Madison’s prescience in Federalist 10 played out on an even larger national stage than
he likely would have envisioned as Wallace’s factional power failed to translate to federal power.
Even though racist demagogues like Wallace won a voice in government, their influence was, for
the most part, kept at bay by more powerful majorities.
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Finally, Madison argued that a large republic would necessarily be divided by expansive
geographic distances that would enforce natural barriers against demagoguery by slowing the
spread of information. In Federalist 10, he writes “Liberty is to faction what air to fire.”39 From
this, one might surmise that Madison’s cure to demagoguery was to restrict liberty and suffocate
it in its infancy. But protecting liberty is one of the foremost objects of government. Restricting
liberty presents significant political problems and sets a troubling precedent. Who decides what
is legitimate political action? What happens if illiberal parties come to power? As Madison
famously wrote, “Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm.” Institutions must be
flexible in their abilities to handle turbulence without having to strong-arm it into submission.
Restricting the flow of information is not a viable cure for demagoguery. Instead of addressing
the cause, Madison suggested that government should deal with the symptoms. He argued that
bad ideas and factional political movements could be controlled “by republican principle, which
enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by majority vote.” Factional interests were
always bound to have a voice in government. The founders relied on the expanse of the country
to ensure that those voices were marginalized. As long as factional ideas were unable to organize
across different regions of the country, they could be controlled by the legislature.
And yet even the cure of republicanism does not work if a majority that cares about
respecting the norms of governance does not exist. In a collection of papers organized and
published after his death, Madison wrote, “In proportion as government is influenced by opinion,
it must be so, by whatever influences opinion.”40 As I and countless others have argued, public
opinion must be refined and instructed. It cannot be left to develop unchecked and without
direction. And yet, public opinion is not subject to any solitary power. It is influenced not only
39
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by political leaders but also by media and interpersonal communication as parts of the process of
political deliberation. Political parties, informal political organizations and interest groups and
political discourse in the media all have important effects on public opinion and can damage a
healthy political climate.
Martin Van Buren, for instance, believed that political parties could tame factional public
opinion by bringing extremist views and candidates into the party structure and leashing them to
a moderate party platform.41 Ideally, people would be more attached to party platforms and
values curated by moderate party elites than populist party candidates but, as Donald Trump’s
dominance of the Republican party has shown, this is not always the case.
Unfortunately, the uncontrolled and unmediated spread of information can hurt
productive political processes and makes it more difficult for responsible democratic majorities
to achieve power. But Madison did not see mass consumption of faulty information as an
existential threat to democracy, possibly because mass consumption of bad information did not
represent the same worry during the founding that it does today. Madison relied on the natural
inefficiencies of interregional communication to separate factions from each other and to keep
them from recognizing when they shared common interests. Even if a populist group in one part
of the country took control of government locally it would be difficult for them to coordinate
with similar groups across large distances.
Even so, the founders were clearly worried about the threat of presidential rhetoric and its
national reach. While members of the House might have been limited in the attention they could
command outside of their constituencies, presidents have always been national figures. A
presidential speech, therefore, had the capacity to reach across regions and obtain national
attention.
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In response to the executive’s far-reaching influence, the founders instituted several
presidential norms accordingly. Washington, for instance, helped shape the character of the
presidency by refraining from engaging in political rhetoric and cultivating the appearance of a
statesman when he appeared before the public.42 He rarely delivered public addresses, refused to
pick political sides and brought political division into his cabinet instead of allowing it to fester
in Congress.43 Most notably, Washington did not use the stature of his office to pressure
Congress in favor of his legislative agenda through speeches or written statements. His
reluctance to engage in political disputes is indicative of a few things. First, Washington was
cognizant of fears among the public that the government would descend into monarchy. Second,
he did not have much of a legislative agenda to begin with. But most importantly, the norms
surrounding presidential rhetoric that Washington set are crucial to understanding how leaders
ought to view their rhetorical responsibilities to their constituencies.
Norms concerning written and spoken rhetoric, for instance, were important to early
presidents. In his book The Rhetorical Presidency, Jeffrey Tulis explains how presidents’ uses of
written rhetoric is different from their uses of oratorical rhetoric.44 While oratory often employs
emotional language and simple themes that move crowds to action but are ill-suited to good
political deliberation -- making it a favorite tool of demagogues -- written rhetoric is better suited
to reasoned argument.45 Because of the inflammatory potential of presidential speech,
responsible presidents like Washington were just as deliberate with the medium of their address
as with its content.
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Most presidential norms restricting manner and medium of address, however, have been
forgotten. Tulis argues that the shift in presidential rhetoric happened because of changes in
institutional norms that increased the executive’s legislative and political role.46 The start of this
shift occurred with Teddy Roosevelt’s use of speech to pressure Congress into expanding the
regulatory purview of the Interstate Commerce Commission to deal with railroad monopolies.47
Yet even before Roosevelt, presidents like Andrew Jackson greatly expanded executive power in
order to get things done.48 Still, the influence of modern logistical and information technology on
political rhetoric is undeniable. As the distances between different parts of the country began to
shrink with the advent of new technologies like the telegraph, the steamboat and the railroad,
politicians and political movements, at one time stymied by great geographic and logistical
chasms, gained the power to connect with each other.49 Before these new technologies, however,
conflicts were more likely to peter out before they reached national significance.
In 1787, for instance, conflicts like Shays’ Rebellions resulted in a regional dispute put
down by the governor of Massachusetts. Shays’ Rebellion, however, was caused by the
weakness of the confederation, the worthlessness of paper currency distributed by the
Confederation and state governments making it difficult for farmers to pay their debts and, of
course, poverty. These were not local issues. They affected a great part of the states in the
confederation. It is easy to imagine how a regional rebellion in Massachusetts might have set off
a larger movement across the states had it been broadcast in real time via telegraph or television.
If its leaders had been able to communicate their grievances, other parts of the country might
have realized they shared some of the same problems and spurred movements of their own.
46
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Shays’ Rebellion might have been transformed into an interregional movement and, eventually,
national political power. Instead, though the rebellion eventually found support in Connecticut
and New Hampshire, it was put down swiftly by Governor Bowdoin of Massachusetts within a
few months of the start of the insurrection. Although Shays’ Rebellion provides only anecdotal
evidence of how communication affects faction, it demonstrates Madison’s theory of how natural
barriers might prevent demagoguery two years before the Constitution had even been ratified.
New communication technologies have greatly increased the threat that unchecked
communication represents to democracy. The country is smaller and more connected than ever
before. Movements, both legitimate and anti-democratic, can quickly build national followings
and translate these followings to action within days. Black Lives Matter protests in the Summer
of 2020, for example, occurred in cities all over the country within days of each other in response
to videos of police violence in several different regions widely shared on social media. The speed
with which the movements were astonishing. This speed is especially dangerous to the
development of deliberative, responsible public opinion. To be clear, I am not commenting on
the character of the Black Lives Matter protests themselves but rather the significance of the
speed with which they were organized. Another movement, largely organized over social media
bringing together people from all over the country in common cause was the January 6th
insurrection. The insurrection is a perfect example of the dangerous potential of modern
communication technology. The speed of communication that these technologies facilitate leaves
little time for deliberation, reflection or even for truth to be established. Large scale action in
different regions of the country can occur simultaneously on the basis of a lie. The natural
barriers that Madison thought would protect faction from organizing itself nationally and
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achieving interregional power have effectively eroded. We are already beginning to see the
consequences of this erosion.
To make matters more dangerous, the nature of the media that is commonly shared
through modern communication technology is especially volatile. Instead of the measured
written political rhetoric favored by the founders or even the instructive oratory of Roosevelt or
Lincoln, social media and television news favors videos clips, short blurbs of text and
infographics. These mediums of communication are reactive, emotional and rapidly consumed
and shared. They are not conducive to deliberation nor do they facilitate the measured pursuit of
truth.
In his paper “The Populist Challenge to Liberal Democracy,” Franz Decker writes that
this new “media democracy” has created a populist politics that is “more responsive and at the
same time more irresponsible.”50 It is not that populism is inherently bad. Decker admits that
populism can create productive democratic engagement as a political force in response to the
exclusion and disenfranchisement of certain groups. It becomes problematic, however, when it
gains traction in government and allows anti-system ideologies to dominate institutions.
Furthermore, populism increases the spread of factious ideas.51 One possible reason for the
relationship between populism and the rapid spread of ideas is that populism is often defined by
what it is against rather than what it is for. Expressing what a movement is against is much easier
than formulating a platform and it is also easier for the public to understand. Populist movements
in the United States such as the Conservative Tea Party movement, for instance, originated as a
grievance against bank bailouts and mortgage default rates.52 These grievances were easy to latch
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on to in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. People felt that the institutions designed to
protect them and hold powerful interests accountable had failed. Anger and resentment,
therefore, aided the spread of the Tea Party and its ideas.
Given the importance of public accountability to incentivize good political leadership, the
public must be willing to hold representatives accountable. But this responsibility is complicated
by the public’s susceptibility to factious ideas. We have seen that the founders were aware of this
vulnerability but relied on the natural communication inefficiencies of their time to keep
factional support for demagogic leaders from spreading too much. Unfortunately, however, these
natural inefficiencies have been rectified and so they no longer function as barriers against
national and interregional support for bad leaders and ideas. If public opinion is the bedrock of
good leadership and the protection of government’s first principles, this bedrock is quickly
degrading.
As Decker explains, the “constitutional state is a response to the paradox that such a
democracy could use democratic means to abolish itself (if the people so decided).”53 It is okay
for public opinion to be wrong on policy. The system of subjective interest and liberalism is
designed to find truth in a diversity of viewpoints. But the public does not have the luxury of
being wrong when it comes to the sanctity of institutions and good governance. It is natural for
the public to become distrustful of institutions that are not responsive and easy for them to
demand reform when it feels its voice is being ignored. It is difficult, however, to incentivize
people to restrain leaders who claim to speak for them. And yet restraining these demagogic
voices is precisely what is required of the public now that modern technology has allowed
factional interests to be shared across the country and to achieve power in government. The
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institutions that Madison and the founders designed to demagogues accountable are no longer as
effective at doing the job themselves.
Still, it is wishful thinking to hope that we might simply inform the public of its
responsibility or educate it to look for the criteria of good political leadership that I established in
chapter one and then expect it to become a more responsible electorate. In the same way that
Madison designed institutions to harness the ambitions of political leaders, we must incentivize
leaders to act in ways that favors responsible public opinion. In the next chapter, I will explore
how we can change election systems and political institutions to incentivize healthier political
discourse between political leaders and, consequently, within the public itself.
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Chapter 3: How do we incentivize good leadership? How do we rebuild barriers to
demagoguery?
So far, we have seen that irresponsible leadership and demagogy are perpetual threats to
democracy. While the founders hoped that representatives accountable to the public would, for
the most part, serve with honor, respect for norms and institutions and refine public opinion
through their interactions, they realized that the public would eventually fall prey to demagogues
and demagogic tactics. This vulnerability, however, did not threaten American democracy
existentially for two reasons: first, the founders predicted that the large size of the country would
keep factions from organizing themselves into national interests and would cool fleeting passions
before they became too destructive. Second, the founder separated the powers of government and
set them at odds with each other so that one branch could not ever tyrannize the others. This
system of checks and balances remedied the effects of demagoguery but it did not alleviate the
cause.
Presently, many of the norms that were supposed to keep representatives from violating
the integrity of the institutions in which they serve and the trust of their constituencies have
changed and some of the institutional checks have eroded. Furthermore, modern communication
technology has made the country a smaller place, causing it to be more susceptible to factional
interests and impulsive political sentiments.
My goals in this chapter are to point out a few ways that we can repair institutions and
norms that favor good political leadership in government and to address the causes of
demagoguery in the public in addition to its symptoms in government. First, I will explore how
we can use Constitutional issues to educate the populace and inculcate a respect for institutions
within it. Then, I will propose some changes to the modern landscape of political discourse and
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campaigns. Finally, I will suggest a few simple changes to the legislative branch to foster more
productive deliberation and deal with the changes that mass communication technology has
caused. In the end, I believe these proposals will incentivize people to elect leaders that satisfy
the criteria we established in chapter 1 and for political leaders to fulfill their roles as both
advocates and educators of the public. Each solution that I will review here is alone worthy of a
thesis. I regret that I will not be able to study each one in depth. Instead, my objective in
expressing these ideas is to provide an overview of a few possible solutions to the problems I
diagnosed in preceding chapters. Further study may determine which solutions work best and
which ones are worth pursuing.

The People:
The founders realized that government was a science of competing interests. Solely
relying on the good behavior of political leaders -- as Hamilton does for judges in Federalist 78
-- was not a good enough barrier to demagoguery and despotism. The interaction between
leadership and the public, however, provided a more promising barrier to bad leadership. The
public would hold leaders accountable and leaders would help refine the public’s perception of
its interests. In order to form protections against demagogic leaders, therefore, we need to
reinforce both sides of the public-representative relationship. While the founders devised
ingenious institutions to harness the dangerous potential of leaders’ ambitions, they mostly relied
on natural features of the republic to curb the dangers of faction in the populace. But public
opinion can be harnessed and elevated too. Making people less susceptible to demagogues and
more informed about their voting choices is an important part of protecting against bad
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leadership, especially as social media has made it easier for populists and factional interests to
build momentum.54
The most obvious way to elevate public opinion is through civic education. By elevating
public opinion, I mean to promote accurate understanding of the public’s long-term interest while
inculcating a respect for democratic institutions. Teaching people about how government
institutions work, the importance of democratic norms and the job of a representative is typically
thought to produce good citizens. By educating citizens about how government works,
democratic societies hope that people will understand what the job of a representative is, thus
allowing them to better hold their representatives accountable. Most people living in liberal
democracies around the world receive some form of civic education about how democratic
institutions work in order to form a responsible electorate. Nonetheless, civic education could be
improved by teaching people about what good political leadership is and the dangers of
demagoguery. Schools could, for instance, take the criteria for a good representative established
in chapter 1 of this thesis and teach the public to look for those qualities in the people they vote
for. Schools could then provide examples of demagogues and dangerous leaders from history and
discuss the characteristics of these leaders that make people vulnerable to being manipulated by
those leaders. Of course, determining which leaders are good and which ones are dangerous is
easier said than done. Deciding when a populist politician is a demagogue or a voice of the
people is often political, value-laden and controversial. Still, educating people about good
leadership and responsible voting from an early age is a good first step in fortifying the public
against demagoguery.
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But this traditional type of civic education is nowhere near enough. The founders
understood that human behavior is more often motivated by ambition than by principle. Simply
teaching the public about the right values might not translate into responsible citizenship if it is
not incentivized in the right ways. Here, constitutional interpretation gives us a framework for
instructing the public with values that it can use to decide who to vote for rather than relying on
the abstract institutional and political knowledge that is taught in traditional civic education. John
E. Finn’s essay “The Civic Constitution: Some Preliminaries” argues that the Constitution should
not only be read as a document of fundamental law but also as embodying the underlying
philosophies and guiding principles for the republic.55 Constitutional interpretation, therefore, is
not just for legal scholars but an important part of citizenship as well. That is not to say that a
lawyer will read the Constitution in the same way that a layman will. Finn argues that the
Constitution serves both a legal and philosophical purpose. To lawyers, judges and other legal
professionals, it declares the supreme laws of the republic. To the public, it provides a set of
values and ethical principles that guide how the country ought to be governed.56
This democratic reading of the Constitution sets the responsibility for Constitutional
maintenance at the feet of the people as well as with the judicial branch. While Federalist 78
argues that judges should see the Constitution as fundamental law in reference to their duty to
sort out contradictions in the law and establish the highest authority in the republic, the Civic
Constitution is concerned with constitutional maintenance rather than interpretation. The
founders conceived of the judiciary’s role in maintaining the Constitution as less far-reaching
than it is currently understood to be. Federalist 78 does not provide for judicial review of the
legislature’s actions. The judiciary’s power stems from its duty to uphold the Constitution’s
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establishment of itself as supreme law. The founders foresaw that the executive and the
legislative branches were liable to test the limits of their power given their respective unilateral
and law-making powers.Therefore, if an act of the legislature contradicts an article of the
Constitution, the Supreme Court is bound to enforce the fundamental law at the expense of the
dependent one. The landmark case Marbury v. Madison established judicial review as part of the
court’s purview. But to give the court sole responsibility over constitutional maintenance is to
ignore the people’s civic duty as guardians of the country’s most important democratic
institution. Worse, by allowing the people to disregard its collective responsibility to uphold the
Constitution’s values, the public’s constitutional understanding and ability to hold the
government accountable atrophies and disappears.57
To counteract the threat of Constitutional ignorance, Finn advocates a new type of civic
duty. Finn’s vision for civic education does not require that citizens recite the details of the
Constitution by heart or that they know institutional complexities of the legislature’s committee
system but rather that they know how they feel about the values that the Constitution prescribes
for the republic.58 In Finn’s view, citizens ought to deliberate about Constitutional issues and be
willing to uphold their values when they feel that the government has failed to uphold them.
Good representatives, political figures and a responsible media can help instruct public opinions
about constitutional issues but the ultimate responsibility for interpretation and maintenance is
with the people. The public must then be ready to vote out representatives who fail to uphold the
public’s values.59
Creating this type of public knowledge requires more than civic education in school. It
requires structured discourse and deliberation in the public about fundamental constitutional
57
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issues and, as Finn puts it, “the Constitutional enterprise.”60 One issue with relying on civic
understanding of the Constitution demands more from the people than other less democratic and
more juridic readings and, therefore, it is far from perfect. The public will, at times, lack the tools
to deal with complex issues. It may arrive at the wrong answers or fail to uphold Constitutional
values in favor of political expediency. But the value of Finn’s approach becomes evident when
considering the dangers of a populace that ignores its duty to the Constitution.61 As Justice
Gibson of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court eloquently wrote in his opinion in Eakin v. Raub,
There is no effectual guard against legislative usurpation, but public opinion, the force of
which, in this country, is inconceivably great. [...] Once let public opinion be so corrupt
as to sanction every misconstruction of the constitution, and abuse of power, which the
temptation of the moment may dictate, and the party which may happen to be
predominant, will laugh at the puny efforts of a dependent power to arrest it in its
course.62
Failure to engage with Constitutional ideals and values will cause the public to disregard
democratic ideals and institutions. The parchment barriers to despotism that the founders
designed must be backed by the force of public will. Otherwise, they become meaningless.
We can apply Finn’s understanding of the Civic Constitution and of civic education to
democratic institutions in general. Instilling knowledge of the Constitutional project alone would
likely increase the public’s respect for other democratic institutions as well. But by expanding
the scope of public deliberations about democratic values to include democratic institutions of all
kinds, we can also form an electorate that is sensitive to these values in its political leadership.
Teaching voters to think about values instead of quick-fix policy and sophistic rhetoric would
60
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also make them less susceptible to demagogues and more likely to hold leaders accountable
when they violate institutional norms or exceed their institutional powers. The challenge then
becomes creating an environment where people can have productive deliberation about
democratic values. Reforming political campaigns and election systems offers a few possible
solutions.
Elections offer leaders opportunities to refine public opinion because they allow
politicians to interact directly with their constituents but they are also dangerous for this very
same reason. The danger comes from the intersection of two human tendencies that the founders
were wary of in government. On the leadership side, those seeking office are driven by ambition
and honor-seeking behavior that is liable to cause them to violate norms and principles to get
what they want. On the constituent side, people are inclined to look for cheap solutions,
emotional arguments and mass movements. To mitigate the threats to democracy that result from
these human tendencies, election systems must alleviate the public’s appetite for demagogic
behavior in order to incentivize it in politicians seeking office.
One way to create a better informed and deliberative electorate is for electoral systems to
institute mini-publics.63 Mini-publics are groups of citizens that are formed to deliberate about
issues. The groups are created to be representative of the communities which have an interest in
the issues being discussed. The groups are first presented with experts who give them
information about the issues and are then asked to make recommendations based on group
consensus. Mini-publics make use of indicative rather than responsive representation.64 While
responsive representation supposes that constituents can trust representatives to act in their best

63

Guerrero. Against Elections.
Pettit, Phillip. n.d. “Representation, Responsive and Indicative.” Constellations 17 (3).
https://www.princeton.edu/~ppettit/papers/2010/Representation,%20Responsive%20and%20Indicative.pd
f.
64

42

interest because they will elect representatives that have similar values, indicative representation
is the opposite. Constituents of indicative representatives can suppose that, because their
representatives look like them and come from similar backgrounds, the decisions that their
representatives make are plausibly similar to the decision their constituents would make if they
were in the same circumstance. Although thorough deliberative democracy better informs public
opinion, opens citizens up to new ideas and produces more legitimate policy decisions in the
eyes of the public, it is also less efficient than traditional voting mechanisms. After all, it takes
time, resources and expertise to form demographically representative groups and create
productive cooperation. Furthermore, deliberative groups must be small for them to work. An
exercise in deliberation might be more efficient in groups of a thousand but it would be much
less effective. Therefore, it is impossible to include an entire country in deliberation. If our goal
is to elevate public opinion and we can only reach a fraction of the public, we are faced with a
serious problem.
Indicative representation and transparency solve this problem. While it may not be
possible to get everyone to participate in a mini-public or a deliberative poll, publicizing the
results and conducting the process with transparency allows people to see how others similar to
them thought about issues when they had the time and information necessary to make an
informed choice. For example, a mini-public discussing the benefits and drawbacks of healthcare
savings accounts (otherwise known as HSAs) may conclude that Congress ought to provide an
HSA for every American. The mini-public can then publicize its decision and the different
reasons why it arrived at this consensus. The deliberations of the group can be made available to
the public as well for increased transparency and to lend the final decision maximal democratic
legitimacy. While the entirety of the public does not have the time, resources or expertise to
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dedicate to deciding whether HSAs are good, it can take into account the mini-public’s
recommendation. This recommendation is legitimized because the public knows that people of
similar backgrounds and values to them agreed with the recommendation.65 Even if they might
not immediately agree with the mini-public’s decisions, members of the public suppose that, if
they had been exposed to the same information and expertise participants in the mini-public were
exposed to, they would have made the same decision.
The indicative representation and publicity solutions are not perfect. There is no
guarantee that deliberative groups will find consensus on every issue nor that the rest of the
public will feel represented in the groups’ final recommendations. But increasing deliberation in
democratic decision making creates outcomes that are more sensitive to truth and a more
inclusive view of justice. If deliberation can be used to inform the public about technical policy
decisions then it can be an effective tool for instructing people about institutional integrity and
democratic values too. While critics may object that value-laden deliberations about the
Constitution or the principles of American government are more political than policy
recommendations and therefore hard to form consensus on, the opposite is true. Democratic
values are not partisan values. Political parties may disagree about how to achieve good policy
outcomes or even what good outcomes are, but if they disagree about the importance of
maintaining democratic institutions then there is a more fundamental problem that needs to be
addressed. Therefore, creating election systems that allow for more deliberation in the electorate,
not just about policy but also concerning the objective and values of republican government
would help elevate public opinion and create more responsible voting patterns.

Elections:
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Still, incentivizing good political leadership and protecting against demagoguery requires
approaching the problem from both the bottom and the top. While deliberative groups may help
elevate public opinion, changing the way that politicians campaign for office can directly affect
the ways that politicians act. While people seeking office will always be liable to say and do
things that violate democratic principles as a way to get elected, designing campaign laws with
this proclivity in mind can minimize the frequency of these anti-democratic and demagogic acts.
One campaign reform that would incentivize more responsible and relevant candidate
rhetoric is discontinuing televised debates. The problems with debates are numerous and diverse.
First, there is controversy over whether debates actually change voters’ opinions. While there is
undoubtedly value in the airtime publicity and legitimacy candidates get from participating in
presidential debates, it is far less clear whether voters actually use them to decide who to vote
for.66 Instead, debates may entrench voters into existing political sentiments. If the objective of
debate is to compare different viewpoints in a reasonable way in order to make an informed vote,
unquestioningly reaffirming voters’ beliefs is incompatible with this goal. But beyond the effects
they have on voters, there are normative problems with how people think debates should work.
In this section, I will focus on how debates have always failed to achieve their purpose and why,
even in their ideal states, debates are ill-suited as a medium for educating the public.
The Commission on Presidential Debates -- an independent organization that sponsors
presidential debates during elections -- vaguely cites the role of debates as “ensur[ing] that the
voting public has the opportunity to see the leading candidates debate during the general election
campaign.” Advocates argue that debates allow voters to compare policy positions of candidates
and determine who has the better argument for her position. But this is an idealistic vision of
debates. National presidential debates, for instance, have only been around since television
66
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allowed them to be broadcast across the country. The nature of televised media and modern
debates are therefore hopelessly intertwined.
Debate rhetoric is not geared towards honest presentation of each side’s argument or
good-faith deliberation, but rather sound-bites making emotional populist appeals designed to
elicit cheers instead of thought. Even without television incentivizing candidates to be
controversial and combative, oral rhetoric, as I discussed in chapter 1, is a poor medium for
instructing the public and is a favorite tool of demagogues.67 Even the Lincoln-Douglas debates
-- often held up as a shining example of democratic deliberation between opposing sides -- were,
as described by historian Harold Holzer, “for the most part an embarrassment. The encounters
were brutally sarcastic, featuring highly personal attacks rather than elevated discourse.”68 The
very nature of debate, therefore, favors controversial, demagogic candidates who use oratory as a
tool to rouse base instincts in the electorate. Television and social media, meanwhile, only
exacerbates candidates’ compulsions towards sound-bite arguments and plays to emotional
populist rhetoric.
And yet, even in their ideal state, debates are not good at providing the public with
relevant information for determining who to vote for. One common but misconceived ideal of
political campaigns is that they should be about policy. Debates, therefore, are meant to present
differences between candidates’ policies. Critiques of modern political debates often feature
complaints that candidates did not discuss policy thoroughly enough. But even if they did, policy
discussions should not be the central focus of political campaigns. In designing American
political institutions, the founders sought to keep policy out of the hands of the people. Public
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opinion, they realized, is subject to brisk changes and dangerous trends. Furthermore, the public
has neither the time nor the resources to effectively debate policy decisions. It was
representatives, sometimes directly elected and sometimes indirectly elected, that were supposed
to do the detail-oriented work of translating the public’s values and principles into policy. Given
that the role of the public as envisioned by the founders did involve policy-analysis, the public
should not be asked to judge the quality of a candidate’s policy proposals when deciding whether
or not to vote for her.
That is not to say there is no place for policy in campaigns and debates. Voters should
vote for candidates who endorse values and ideas that seem to be in their best interest. Proposing
policy in broad strokes is a perfectly acceptable way for a candidate to communicate her values.
Still, we should remain wary of the dangers inherent in discussing policy. If, on one hand, the
public should not have to deal with the minutiae of detailed policy arguments and, on the other
hand, demagogues are prone to propose ambitious policies with no real basis in reality, it seems
that there is no safe way for candidates to discuss policy in their campaigns. If the normative
ideal for good political debates is to foster competition between policy proposals, then debates
provide much less value to voters than is commonly thought while also incentivizing candidates
to use demagogic rhetoric that undermines trust in democratic institutions and confounds public
opinion.
Debates are not the only part of the election process that has harmed candidates’ rhetoric
and the way that they run their campaigns. Partisan gerrymandering has significantly diminished
the number of competitive races every election cycle. Gerrymandering refers to the process of
manipulating voting districts to favor certain parties. For example, during the redistricting
process, Democrats in Maryland packed swaths of Democratic voters into districts represented
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by Republicans, effectively turning red districts blue.69 The widespread use of partisan
gerrymandering to cement parties’ holds on state governments and the House seats has made
most races throughout the country practically unlosable for incumbents.70 In addition to other
incumbent advantages like better fundraising operations and name recognition, modern partisan
gerrymandering has become a science. New technologies and data gathering has allowed parties
to target voters at an unprecedented level. As a result of these new capabilities, parties have been
able to cement control of state legislatures and retain House seats consistently in states they have
gerrymandered even when losing the popular vote in these very same states.71
Some have argued that gerrymandering that decreases competitiveness causes
polarization.72 If candidates are incentivized to play to their bases instead of reaching out to
moderate voters, more extreme candidates will win. But there has been some debate as to
whether or not incumbency advantage and partisan gerrymandering cause polarization between
parties. In some states, gerrymandering has increased the number of competitive races as parties
try to put previously non-competitive districts in play.73 Additionally, the causes of polarization
are numerous and complex and it is difficult to pin everything on gerrymandering.74
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But gerrymandering can hurt voters in other ways. Competition allows voters to hold
leaders accountable and, more importantly, allows their voices to be heard. While there is not any
evidence that competitive races cause voters to make better decisions, trust in democracy suffers
when people feel that they are not being listened to or that their vote does not matter.75 Partisan
gerrymandering has decreased the number of votes that really matter. Districts that are packed
with votes of the same party cause races in one or two places in a state to be won by a wide
margin while other districts have an impossibly small number of voters from the same party.
Increasingly, races are not close. When voters feel their vote is not important they are less likely
to feel engaged in democracy, pay attention to political races and care about democratic
institutions.76 Therefore, even if competitive races and gerrymandering do not directly cause
voters to make worse decisions, the appearance of democratic injustice they cause are just as
damaging to democracy. The less voters feel seen, the less they are likely to care. And apathetic
voters are not capable of conducting their civic duties to hold bad leaders accountable.
Another way of reforming campaigns or at least of mitigating the damaging effects of
campaigns in a polarized political climate -- is to listen to Van Buren’s suggestion that political
parties can be tools for controlling faction and extremism. Strengthening party infrastructure and
the party’s political influence could constrain fringe candidates by forcing them to appeal to
more moderate party leaders for money, campaign staff and endorsements. Forcing factional
candidates to be accountable to party leadership could then allow leadership with more
institutional knowledge to temper the demagogic tendencies of their candidates.
Recently, weak parties have caused some candidates to build their campaigns outside of
the party apparatuses. In 2008, for instance, Barack Obama built his presidential campaign
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largely outside of the Democratic party’s infrastructure.77 In 2016, Trump did the same thing and
then relied on some Republican party organizing after he had secured the nomination and the
Republican establishment had capitulated to him in the interest of political expediency.78 In 2018,
progressive Democratic candidate Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez built her campaign completely
outside of the Democratic party’s structure and succeeded in unseating a longtime establishment
incumbent.79 By empowering party infrastructure, parties could have more power to anoint
candidates that are experienced. While strong parties may not necessarily be more politically
moderate than their fringe members, they would constrain irresponsible candidates from doing
serious damage to democratic institutions. A possible criticism of allowing party leaders to
anoint candidates is that it is anti-democratic. But even with strong parties, voters would still be
able to elect who they want. Allowing experienced party establishment to have a bigger say in
the process of selecting good candidates for office is another way of instructing public opinion
and one more hurdle demagogic candidates would have to pass.

Institutions:
Another way to reform elections and strengthen parties would be to adopt a system of
mixed-member representation. Mixed-member systems allow citizens to directly vote for
representatives based on districts and then, additionally, assign representatives to the legislature
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in proportion to the percentage of the vote that their parties receive.80 Representatives from this
proportional election process are selected from a party list. The party is likely to put its
leadership at the top of the list so that it is guaranteed a seat in government and likely to place
fringe candidates last.
Mixed-member systems would increase party power and responsibility in a few different
ways. First, they would incentivize a multi-party system. Fringe candidates that might not have a
chance of winning a direct district election could win a sizable enough portion of the vote to get
into government without needing to attach themselves to more established party infrastructures.
These candidates would be more likely to form their own parties instead of allowing themselves
to sit at the bottom of establishment party lists. White it may seem like detaching fringe
candidates from party establishments would unshackle any restraints party elites could have
placed on them and, therefore, creates more factions and demagogues, this is not the case. By
creating more parties, more established and moderate parties will not have to internally
accommodate factional interests in their platforms to attract enough voters. Then, by allowing
these factional interests a seat in government, institutions designed to quell extremism and favor
cooperation could deal with demagogues as the founders created them to. As Madison argued in
Federalist 10, majorities could drown out the voices of faction in government and the legislature
would thrive with a greater diversity of opinion and interests.
Government institutions also need to be updated in order to more effectively promote
good leadership. Modern representatives do as much political work in office as on the campaign
trail. The issues of demagogic rhetoric and norm violations are just as prevalent in government.
Institutional reforms that take into account how modern representatives communicate with their
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constituencies and supporters are important to de-incentivizing bad faith votes and negotiations
for political purposes in the legislature. The increased proximity of representatives to their
constituents through television and social media has turned many committee hearings and floor
debates and votes into political spectacles. In her independently published book The Art of the
Political Deal, Jill Lawrence lists privacy as an important condition for productive negotiation.
Increasing privacy in the legislature, therefore, would de-incentivize representatives from
making arguments to televisions cameras instead of to their colleagues on the floor.
Newt Gingrich, for example, was an early adopter of CSPAN as a political tool. After he
was elected to the House in 1978, Gingrich formed a group of firebrand Republicans he named
the Conservative Opportunity Society. After Richard Nixon’s Watergate scandal, Republicans’
had lost political power. Gingrich resented the attitude among establishment Republicans that
they would be permanently in the minority. In order to change voters’ minds, Gingrich worked to
stunt cooperation in Congress so that voters would blame Democrats for inaction.81
In his efforts to transform the Republican party, Gingrich realized the power of television.
He and other members of his caucus routinely made hour-long speeches on the floor of empty
House chambers for the sole purpose of getting on TV and making emotional appeals to their
supporters. In an article about how Gingrich permanently changed American politics with his
fiery partisan rhetoric and norm-busting obstructionism, McKay Coppins writes,
Gingrich and his cohort showed little interest in legislating, a task that had heretofore
been seen as the primary responsibility of elected legislators. [...] For revolutionary
purposes, the House of Representatives was less a governing body than an arena for
conflict and drama. And Gingrich found ways to put on a show. He recognized an
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opportunity in the newly installed C-span cameras, and began delivering tirades against
Democrats to an empty chamber, knowing that his remarks would be beamed to viewers
across the country.82
Gingrich’s instinct for media attention is important to understanding how he thought about
politics. In Coppins’s article, he explains, “The No. 1 fact about the news media is they love
fights … When you give them confrontations, you get attention; when you get attention, you can
educate.”83 Gingrich’s rhetoric on the House floor, therefore, was rarely in good faith. Even when
debating policy he directed his comments at his constituents. He also came up with lists of
nicknames for political opponents to get attention. If, as we established in chapter 1, the primary
objective of a representative is to produce good policy, Gingrich failed to meet this criteria.

And yet, his plan worked. In 1995 Republicans picked up seats and took control of both
the Senate and House with votes blaming Democrats for not getting enough done.84 Since the
founders understood that ambition would drive representatives to use every tool at their disposal
to gain power, they designed institutions that would flourish with personal ambition. The
founders, however, could not have foreseen the effect of television on publicizing floor debates.
Restoring privacy to these debates would force members to address one another instead of
making populist calls to constituents and performing political stunts in Congress. After all, it was
Gingrich’s type of theatrical oratory that worried the founders and that they sought to keep out of
government. Enforcing the ban on cell phones in the legislatures’ chambers or not airing floor
deliberations would both help increase privacy and keep representatives like Gingrich from
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abusing the media’s taste for controversy for political gain at the expense of a well-functioning
legislature.

Mass communication technology is not going away and it is difficult to regulate. These
new technologies have permanently undermined the natural size barriers to demagoguery that the
founder envisioned. The unprecedented proximity that communication technology has created
between representatives and constituents as well as the acceleration of the spread of information
between regions of the country must be addressed. In his book A More Perfect Constitution,
Larry Sabato argues that modern threats to the continuity of government from terrorist attacks
warrant amending the Constitution to clarify how government should react to threats that
threaten the existence of government.85 Since technological incentives to demagoguery also
threaten the continuity of our democratic institutions, these threats warrant fundamental
institutional changes to government such as the ones I review in this chapter.
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Conclusion:

In this thesis, we have seen the dangers inherent in government dependent on the people.
We used the lens of American democracy to see how the founders of republican governments
have devised ways to mitigate the threats of popular rule. Then, we saw how some of those
mitigating measures have begun to fail us, partly as a result of decay and partly because of new
technologies that have undermined natural barriers to demagoguery in liberal democracies.
Finally, I provided solutions to rebuild barriers to demagoguery at institutional, electoral and
civic levels.

More broadly, this thesis tries to figure out how to get people to elect better political
leaders. If democratic government is designed to track the interests of the people, then the surest
way to improve its performance is to make sure that the people know their interests and that their
representatives are responsive. Ensuring responsiveness is, while not an easy task, the more
manageable of the two. Personal ambition ensures that representatives will usually try to stay on
the public’s good side while elections provide opportunities for the public to hold their
representatives accountable. While the threat of representative capture by special interests and
corruption always looms overhead, strong democratic norms and oversight are good tools to keep
these threats at bay. For the public to know its interest, though, is another matter. Interest is
diverse and, as we saw in chapter 1, subjective. Even if determining objective interest was
possible, allowing expert representatives or technocrats to determine objective interests risks
undermining responsiveness and, consequently, trust in democratic institutions. Democratic
government is inevitably at the mercy of public opinion. It was designed that way.

55

But government has a few tools at its disposal to protect itself against the baser instincts
of the public. Principled institutions ratified by the people can swallow the dangerous tendencies
of faction and extremism and produce good outcomes. These institutions can also work with
representatives of the people by incentivizing them to refine public opinion and instruct the
public in its true interests. Of course, democracy cannot always rely on instructive leadership. In
cases of irresponsible and demagogic representatives, a strong adherence to democratic norms
and principles inculcated in the people through civic education and deliberation must outlast and
overpower entropic predispositions. Furthermore, people’s votes should be instructed by a focus
on political values rather than policy debates in order to narrow the scope of what electorates
must pay attention to. Hopefully, by simplifying the voting process, citizens will have a better
sense of what concerns them and what their interests are and elections will result in better
leaders.

Demagoguery is not the only danger to public opinion. Other factors like inequality have
been shown to increase membership of anti-system political parties and extremism.86 Another
approach to protecting democracies from demagoguery could be to reduce the economic
conditions under which factions thrive. Instinct tells me that a reasonable cure to demagoguery
must approach the problem from both social and economic perspectives. I will, however, leave
the latter part of the solution to a future paper.
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